|[and here she drew on a small chalkboard]|
for, if the latter,
then it can as well be said
that the man is covered by only
a part of the sail.
Now, if the sail is cut apart, then it could be said that the
covers the man
but not the whole sail.”
At this point, Russell jumped in.
“The problem derives,”
“from a misunderstanding of
from a belief that it is a contradiction
that if something, say A, is greater than B and less
than C it must be both great and small, part and whole.”
“Yes,” said Thuragania,
“the basic premise of monism
is that the real is essentially one.
the only true being
is the One , which cannot be divided because the whole
is everywhere present.
That nothing changes follows
from his argument that what is is, for
if it came into being, it is not: nor is it
if it is going to be in the future.
Consequently, there is no change
in Nature, as defined as things
coming into being or ceasing
to be. And so,
to return to the sail,
if the whole is everywhere present,
then the whole sail
covers the man,
even if part of the man is